




A Brief History of Safety Thinking: Theoretical Models of Incident Causation and their Application to Sport & Outdoor Programming

Delta State Presentation, October 4, 2022: Part I of II

Jeff Baierlein, Director, Viristar

viristar.com

viristar.com/safety-science-delta-state



Outline of Session





Introductions



Presentation: application to sport, outdoor programs



Presentation: safety science



Self-assessment



Discussion



Closure

Outcomes



You will:



Understand risk management theories and models used across industries



Identify which models are most widely accepted as current best practice



Identify which model or models may be most useful for your context



Understand the extent to which your current risk management structure reflects best practice




Establish an action plan for making any necessary improvements




Understand where to go to learn more about risk management for sport & outdoor programs

Principal Concepts






Many models of how to manage risk exist



It's important to use current models



Current models employ complex socio-technical systems theory



The Risk Domains Model is one current model



The Risk Domains model can be applied to sport/outdoor programs via resilience engineering & other techniques

On May 29, 2018, University of Maryland offensive lineman Jordan McNair collapsed from heatstroke during a practice. He died two weeks later.

His body core temperature was 41.1 degrees C (106 F).

An investigation showed he was not properly cared for after showing heat stroke symptoms. Standard treatment (cold water) immersion was not performed.

It was more than an hour before anyone called 911.



Basic Concepts



Risk: the possibility of undesirable loss.

Risk Management: the process of maintaining risk at a socially acceptably level.

Four ways to manage risk:


Ŵ	Eliminate	Avoid certain activities, locations, conditions	No BASE jumping
	Reduce	Institute sound safety practices	Assess providers before use
Θ	Transfer	Pass risk to insurers, contractors, participants	Liability waivers
Y	Accept	Acknowledge some risk as unavoidable	Inherent risk

Safety Science



The field of risk management includes:

- Career specialists
- Theories, models
- Academic journals
- PhD programs in risk management
- Best practices that apply across industries



Risk Management Models



The importance of using appropriate models:

- Your risk management system is based on theoretical models.
- Some models are now considered obsolete.
- You have a duty to use the current best thinking in risk management
- You may be held to that standard if an incident occurs.



Evolution in Safety Thinking



Age of systems thinking Age of safety management Age of human factors Age of technology

1800s	1970s	1980s	1990s

Technology

Humans as cogs in an industrial machine

Domino Model, **Root Cause Analysis**

Human Factors

Humans as hazards to be controlled

Rules-based safety

Safety Management

Adapting dynamically to risk environment

Integrated safety culture

Systems Thinking

Complex sociotechnical systems

Resilience engineering

Evolution in Safety Thinking



Principle of causation

Single causes ('Root')

Multiple causes ('Latent')

Complex outcomes ('Emergent')


OUTDATED

OUTDATED

CURRENT

(non-linear)

Epidemiological model (complex linear)




Linear Models




Domino model

Herbert Heinrich, *Industrial Accident Prevention*, 1931.



The injury is caused by the action of preceding factors.



The unsafe act and mechanical hazard constitute the central factor in the accident sequence.


The removal of the central factor makes the action of preceding factors ineffective.

Linear Models




Fault tree analysis, Fishbone diagram

CAUSES OF SLIP-FALL INCIDENT



Epidemiological Model





- Events + latent conditions
- Like an exposure + a pathogen reservoir
- Complex linear model
- First systems model

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. 327, 475-484 (1990)

Printed in Great Britain

The contribution of latent human failures to the breakdown of complex systems

By J. REASON

Department of Psychology, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, U.K.

Several recent accidents in complex high-risk technologies had their primary origins in a variety of delayed-action human failures committed long before an emergency state could be recognized. These disasters were due to the adverse conjunction of a

475

Complex Systems Model



Characteristics of complex systems:

- Difficulty in achieving widely shared recognition that a problem even exists, and agreeing on a shared definition of the problem
- Difficulty identifying all the specific factors that influence the problem
- Limited or no influence or control over some causal elements of the problem
- Uncertainty about the impacts of specific interventions
- Incomplete information about the causes of the problem and the effectiveness of potential solutions
- A constantly shifting landscape where the nature of the problem itself and potential solutions are always changing

Examples of complex systems:



Global climate crisis



Inequity & exclusion




Organized sports










Deviation Analysis/OARU


Government	Passes laws
Regulators, Association	ons Create regulations
Company	Sets policies
Management	Makes operating plans
Staff	Performs work actions
Work	May involve hazardouts processes


AcciMap adapted from: Risk Management In a Dynamic Society: A Modelling Problem. Jens Rasmussen, Safety Science 27/2-3 (1997)












Risk Domains Model





Limitations of Risk Assessments



Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) approach:

Risk	Probability	Magnitude	Treatment
	0.0		

		Magnitude		
		Slight	Moderate	Severe
oility	Unlikely			
Probability	Possible			
_	Likely			

Limitations of Risk Assessments



- Typically assesses only direct, immediate risks from specific activities, locations or populations, such as
 - weather
 - traffic hazards
 - equipment failure
- Typically fails to account for underlying risk factors such as:
 - poor safety culture
 - financial pressures
 - deficits in training & documentation
 - lack of regulatory oversight
- Typically fails to account for human factors in error causation, e.g.
 - cognitive biases
 - cognitive shortcuts (heuristics)
- Fails to consider systems effects: how multiple risks interact in complex and unpredictable ways that to lead to incidents
- Ineffective as a comprehensive risk management tool or stand-alone indicator of good risk management







A Brief History of Safety Thinking: Theoretical Models of Incident Causation and their Application to Sport & Outdoor Programming

Delta State Presentation, October 4, 2022: Part I of II

Jeff Baierlein, Director, Viristar

viristar.com

viristar.com/safety-science-delta-state

